

Implementation of PRA Policy at the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Regulatory Context

- Traditional regulatory environment
 - Design basis accidents
 - Single failure criterion
 - Defense in depth
 - Safety margins
- Regulations
- Conservatism
- Incremental use of risk assessment
- Policy
 - Safety goals
 - PRA
- Realism

PRA Policy Statement

➤ Background

- “NRC has generally regulated the use of nuclear material based on deterministic approaches... A probabilistic approach to regulation enhances and extends this traditional, deterministic approach, by: (1) allowing consideration of a broader set of potential challenges to safety, (2) providing a logical means for prioritizing these challenges based on risk significance, and (3) allowing a broader set of resources to defend against these challenges.”

PRA Policy Statement

- Increase use of PRA technology in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a way that complements the deterministic approach and supports the traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.
- Use PRA, where practical within the bounds of the state-of-the-art, to reduce unnecessary conservatism in current regulatory requirements, regulatory guides, license commitments, and staff positions and to support proposals for additional regulatory requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109 (Backfit Rule).

PRA Policy Statement

- PRAs used in regulatory decisions should be as realistic as practicable and supporting data should be publicly available.
- Safety goals and subsidiary numerical objectives are to used with appropriate consideration of uncertainties in making regulatory judgments on the need for new generic requirements.

Policy Implementation: Rule Changes

- Risk-informed requirement additions
 - Station blackout (10CFR50.63)
 - Anticipated transients without scram (50.62)
 - Maintenance (50.65)
- Risk-informed requirement reductions
 - Combustible gas control (50.44)
- Risk-informed alternatives
 - 50.48(c) "National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805"
 - 50.61a "Fracture toughness requirements for protection against pressurized thermal shock events"
 - 50.46a "Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-water nuclear power reactors" [proposed rule]
 - 50.69 "Risk-informed categorization and treatment of systems, structures and components for nuclear power reactors"


Policy Implementation: Licensing Basis Changes (Regulatory Guide 1.174)

➤ Expectations

- Safety impacts evaluated in integrated manner
- Scope, level of detail, and technical acceptability of engineering analyses should be
 - appropriate for scope of change
 - based on as-built, as-operated plant
 - reflect operating experience
- PRA quality assurance and quality control
- Appropriate consideration of uncertainty

Policy Implementation: Licensing Basis Changes

➤ An integrated evaluation is:



Summary

- NRC's Safety Goal and PRA Policy Statements include mechanisms to manage uncertainty
 - PRA as an alternative, realistic, view
 - Consideration of safety margins and defense in depth
 - Monitoring of performance
 - Use of mean values
- NRC has successfully implemented these policies
 - Rule changes
 - Licensing basis changes